A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2005
Volume: 95
Issue: 1
Pages: 347-373

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:1:p:347-373
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25