Tax Smoothing in Frictional Labor Markets

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2012
Volume: 120
Issue: 5
Pages: 926 - 985

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The optimality of tax smoothing is reexamined using frictional labor markets. In a calibrated matching model that generates empirically relevant labor market fluctuations conditional on exogenous fiscal policy, the Ramsey-optimal policy calls for extreme labor tax rate volatility. Purposeful tax volatility induces dramatically smaller, but efficient, fluctuations of labor markets by keeping distortions constant over the business cycle. We relate the results to standard Ramsey theory by developing welfare-relevant concepts of efficiency and distortions based on primitive matching frictions. Although the basic Ramsey principles of "wedge smoothing" and zero intertemporal distortions hold, tax smoothing depends on whether wages are set efficiently.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/668837
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24