Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices

A-Tier
Journal: Economic Journal
Year: 2025
Volume: 135
Issue: 665
Pages: 81-118

Authors (4)

Laura Derksen (not in RePEc) Jason T Kerwin (Massachusetts Institute of Tec...) Natalia Ordaz Reynoso (not in RePEc) Olivier Sterck (Oxford University)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:econjl:v:135:y:2025:i:665:p:81-118.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-25