The Schumpeterian role of banks: Credit reallocation and capital structure

B-Tier
Journal: European Economic Review
Year: 2020
Volume: 121
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Capital reallocation across firms is a key source of productivity gains. This paper studies the ‘Schumpeterian role’ of banks: They liquidate loans to firms with poor prospects and reallocate the proceeds to more successful, expanding firms. To absorb liquidation losses without violating regulatory requirements, banks need to raise costly equity buffers ex ante. To economize on these buffers, they tend to reallocate too little credit and continue lending to weak firms. Tight capital standards, differentiated risk weights and low costs of bank equity facilitate reallocation. If agency costs of outside equity financing are not too high, their ability to reallocate credit renders banks more efficient than direct finance.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eecrev:v:121:y:2020:i:c:s0014292119302090
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25