Family Transfers Involving Three Generations

B-Tier
Journal: Scandanavian Journal of Economics
Year: 2001
Volume: 103
Issue: 3
Pages: 415-443

Authors (2)

Luc Arrondel (Paris School of Economics) Andre Masson (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Most models of family transfers consider only two generations and focus on two motives: altruism and exchange. They also assume perfect substitution between inter‐vivos downward transfers and bequests. Based on French evidence, we show that parent‐to‐child transfers belong to three distinct categories (investment in child's education, financial assistance, wealth transmission), and advocate a three‐generation framework. Thus, transfer behavior of parents toward their children is strongly influenced by the behavior of their own parents. There is also some evidence of the Cox and Stark demonstration effect: parents help their own parents, expecting to receive comparable support from their children. Such behavior can be regarded as indirect reciprocity: the beneficiary does not give back to the initial giver but to a third person of another generation. JEL classification: D10; D31; D63; D64

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:3:p:415-443
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24