Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2015
Volume: 159
Issue: PA
Pages: 163-208

Score contribution per author:

1.341 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others' expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others' attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in a series of dictator game experiments. We find a strong causal effect of recipients' expectations on dictators' transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between transfers and expectations can be both positive and negative, obscuring the effect in the aggregate. Finally, we provide evidence that dictators care about what recipients know about the intentions behind surprises.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:163-208
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25