A Market-Based Solution for Fire Sales and Other Pecuniary Externalities

S-Tier
Journal: Journal of Political Economy
Year: 2021
Volume: 129
Issue: 4
Pages: 981 - 1010

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In economies with a continuum of agents of different types, pecuniary externalities are removed with market exchanges. Agents choose from among various possible prices they want to prevail in the future and buy or sell rights in these market exchanges for future trade. Each agent can choose the exchange it wants without regard to what any other agent is doing. But crucially, the right to trade in each and every exchange is priced. The fee structure has a per-unit price and quantity decomposition: a price, as determined by the exchange chosen, times the quantity of rights acquired.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/712787
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25