Historical Property Rights, Sociality, and the Emergence of Impersonal Exchange in Long-Distance Trade

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2008
Volume: 98
Issue: 3
Pages: 1009-39

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of unenforced property rights hinders our subjects' ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:1009-39
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25