Revisiting kin and ethnic favoritism in the bribery experiment

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2025
Volume: 256
Issue: C

Authors (3)

Akbari, Mahsa (not in RePEc) Bahrami-Rad, Duman (not in RePEc) Kimbrough, Erik O. (Chapman University)

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report a conceptual replication of Akbari et al. (2020), who study the impact of co-ethnicity and kinship on behavior in an experimental “bribery game”. In the game, player A can offer a bribe to B, who can help A by inefficiently transferring resources from passive third-party C. We replicate the finding that by varying the relatedness of A, B and C, we can substantially modulate the willingness of A to offer the bribe and the willingness of B to reciprocate the bribe by harming C. The findings are consistent with theories of kin altruism and ethnic favoritism.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:256:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525004069
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25