A more general theory of commodity bundling

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2013
Volume: 148
Issue: 2
Pages: 448-472

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand for products. When separate sellers coordinate on a bundle discount, they can use the discount to relax competition, which can harm welfare.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:2:p:448-472
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24