Search and Ripoff Externalities

B-Tier
Journal: Review of Industrial Organization
Year: 2015
Volume: 47
Issue: 3
Pages: 273-302

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper surveys models of markets in which only some consumers are “savvy”. I discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals available to all consumers (the case of search externalities), and when the non-savvy consumers fund generous deals for all consumers (ripoff externalities). I also discuss when the two groups of consumers have aligned or divergent views about market interventions. The analysis focusses on two kinds of models: (1) an indivisible product in a market with price dispersion; and (2) products that involve add-on pricing. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:revind:v:47:y:2015:i:3:p:273-302
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24