Commitment vs. Discretion in the UK: An Empirical Investigation of the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Regime

B-Tier
Journal: International Journal of Central Banking
Year: 2013
Volume: 9
Issue: 4
Pages: 99-152

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper investigates the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in the post-ERM period in the United Kingdom. Using a simple DSGE New Keynesian model of non-cooperative monetary and fiscal policy interactions under fiscal intraperiod leadership, we demonstrate that the past policy in the United Kingdom is better explained by optimal policy under discretion than under commitment. We estimate policy objectives of both policymakers. We demonstrate that fiscal policy plays an important role in identifying the monetary policy regime.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:ijc:ijcjou:y:2013:q:4:a:4
Journal Field
Macro
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25