YOU ARE ONE OF US NOW! HOW DO SHARE PRICES OF RIVALS REACT TO PRIVATIZATION?*

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Industrial Economics
Year: 2009
Volume: 57
Issue: 2
Pages: 265-293

Authors (4)

Z. AYCA ALTINTIG (not in RePEc) K. PEREN ARIN (Australian National University) EBERHARD FEESS (Victoria University of Welling...) CHRISTOPH SCHUMACHER (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 4 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

By using a unique data set from the Turkish cement industry, we analyze the impact of privatization on the market value of rival firms. Privatization increases efficiency, which is bad news for rivals. But if an incumbent buys a state owned firm, this leads to a higher market concentration which is good news for rivals. We show that privatization leads to overall positive abnormal returns for rivals because the concentration effect outweighs the efficiency effect. Consistent with our theory, this effect is reinforced when the initial market concentration is high.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:bla:jindec:v:57:y:2009:i:2:p:265-293
Journal Field
Industrial Organization
Author Count
4
Added to Database
2026-01-24