Social networks, self-denial, and median preferences: Conformity as an evolutionary strategy

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 37
Issue: 4
Pages: 1319-1327

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Attitudes of conformity can be understood as a product of adaptation. Existing models of conformity invoke preference falsification with individuals hiding their true preferences. We posit an adaptive mechanism for conformity. Because non-conformity leads to costs as a dissenting individual is shut out of social networks and majority coalitions, individuals have an incentive to sublimate their original preferences to a meta-preference for conformity. However, this adaptation is not costless. Resisting original preferences imposes self-denial costs that may exceed the benefits of conforming. Further, a conforming individual foregoes the small probability that his first-best original preferences will be realized.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:1319-1327
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25