The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2014
Volume: 124
Issue: 3
Pages: 420-423

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:420-423
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25