Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2016
Volume: 106
Issue: 3
Pages: 699-738

Authors (2)

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We investigate the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating liquidity traps. When constrained households engage in deleveraging, the interest rate needs to fall to induce unconstrained households to pick up the decline in aggregate demand. If the fall in the interest rate is limited by the zero lower bound, aggregate demand is insufficient and the economy enters a liquidity trap. In this environment, households' ex ante leverage and insurance decisions are associated with aggregate demand externalities. Welfare can be improved with macroprudential policies targeted toward reducing leverage. Interest rate policy is inferior to macroprudential policies in dealing with excessive leverage. (JEL D14, E23, E32, E43, E52, E61, E62)

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:106:y:2016:i:3:p:699-738
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25