Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: Overall distortion and type-partitioning

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2013
Volume: 118
Issue: 3
Pages: 439-441

Score contribution per author:

0.335 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In screening with non-concave costs: (i) cycles of active IC constraints can make all packages distorted; (ii) standard screening can be less profitable than price discrimination within a consumer type using first-come-first-served rationing.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:439-441
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25