Mothballing in a Duopoly: Evidence from a (Shale) Oil Market

A-Tier
Journal: Energy Economics
Year: 2021
Volume: 104
Issue: C

Authors (6)

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 6 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The mothballing option has been studied in the literature, but mainly in decision theoretic frameworks. This paper looks at it from a strategic point of view and applies it to an incumbent-entrant framework. In particular, based on the recent strategic interactions between OPEC and the shale oil industry, we conduct a case study where the incumbent OPEC is a flexible producer that competes with a representative shale oil firm. Upon entry, the latter produces a fixed amount but it can apply the mothballing option in times of low demand.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:eneeco:v:104:y:2021:i:c:s0140988321004539
Journal Field
Energy
Author Count
6
Added to Database
2026-01-25