Asymmetries in federal reserve objectives

B-Tier
Journal: Economic Policy
Year: 2025
Volume: 40
Issue: 122
Pages: 371-400

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper uses evidence from the Federal Open Market Committee’s Summary of Economic Projections to show that US monetary policymakers have objectives over unemployment and inflation outcomes that are not well approximated through a conventional quadratic loss function. Rather, policymakers derive material costs (benefits) from overshooting (undershooting) their long-run inflation and unemployment goals. The trade-off between the resultant downward tilts in unemployment and inflation played a key role in shaping the evolution of monetary policy choices since the Great Recession.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:ecpoli:v:40:y:2025:i:122:p:371-400.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25