Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1996
Volume: 63
Issue: 4
Pages: 595-609

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Consumption data generally indicates that consumption risk is not perfectly diversified across individuals. This paper considers if and when imperfect diversification is a feature of efficient allocations in a symmetric information environment without commitment. It shows that if individuals are sufficiently patient, imperfect diversification is always sub-optimal in the long run; however, if individuals are not so patient, imperfect diversification is always optimal. The paper goes on to demonstrate that the way that history matters in an efficient allocation in a symmetric-information/no-commitment environment can be used to distinguish lack of commitment from other possible rationalizations of imperfect risk sharing, such as efficiency in the presence of asymmetric information.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:63:y:1996:i:4:p:595-609.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25