Multimarket contact in continuous-time games

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 101
Issue: 1
Pages: 4-5

Authors (2)

Kobayashi, Hajime (Kansai University) Ohta, Katsunori (Kansai University, faculty of ...)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether multimarket contact is effective in increasing the value of collusion. We show that for any discount rate, the set of equilibrium payoffs (average per market) expands through multimarket contact in continuous-time games.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:1:p:4-5
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25