Giving it now or later: Altruism and discounting

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 102
Issue: 3
Pages: 152-154

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Postponing payments in the Dictator game, subjects allocate future payments between themselves and others. Since both payoffs of Dictators and Receivers are delayed equally, standard intertemporal utility maximization predicts no effect. Nevertheless, we observe negative effect of time on altruism.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:152-154
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25