Learning in network games

B-Tier
Journal: Quantitative Economics
Year: 2018
Volume: 9
Issue: 1
Pages: 85-139

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their information requirements. Our experimental design enables us to observe both which actions participants choose and which information they consult before making their choices. We use these data to estimate learning types using finite mixture models. Monitoring information requests turns out to be crucial, as estimates based on choices alone show substantial biases. We also find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbors) tend to resort to simpler rules compared to those with only one network neighbor.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:wly:quante:v:9:y:2018:i:1:p:85-139
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25