Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2008
Volume: 100
Issue: 3
Pages: 399-401

Authors (2)

Koch, Alexander K. (Aarhus Universitet) Peyrache, Eloïc (not in RePEc)

Score contribution per author:

0.503 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts ("one-size-fits-all") can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:3:p:399-401
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25