Goals and bracketing under mental accounting

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Year: 2016
Volume: 162
Issue: C
Pages: 305-351

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Behavioral economics struggles to explain why people sometimes evaluate outcomes separately (narrow bracketing of mental accounts) and sometimes jointly (broad bracketing). We develop a theory of endogenous bracketing, where people set goals to tackle self-control problems. Goals induce reference points that make substandard performance painful. Evaluating goals in a broadly bracketed mental account insulates an individual from exogenous risk of failure; but because decisions or risks in different tasks become substitutes there are incentives to deviate from goals that are absent under narrow bracketing. Extensions include goal revision, naïveté about self-control, income targeting, and firms' bundling strategies.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jetheo:v:162:y:2016:i:c:p:305-351
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-25