Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

C-Tier
Journal: Economics Letters
Year: 2009
Volume: 102
Issue: 2
Pages: 109-111

Score contribution per author:

1.005 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 0.5x C-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:2:p:109-111
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25