Drug Policy and Federalism.

B-Tier
Journal: Public Choice
Year: 1994
Volume: 80
Issue: 1-2
Pages: 55-68

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Supply-restricting drug policy is inefficient from an economic point of view but is nevertheless widely used. This paper explains this phenomenon as individually rational behavior for local government. Because supply restriction gives addicts an incentive to migrate it has an external effect. This effect makes a policy of supply restrictions individually rational but leads to socially wasteful competition between local governments in a federal system. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:kap:pubcho:v:80:y:1994:i:1-2:p:55-68
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25