Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics
Year: 2022
Volume: 103
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper re-examines the incompatibility of Strong Pareto, as an axiom of sensitivity, and Strong Anonymity, as an axiom of impartiality, when comparing well-being profiles with a countably infinite number of components. We ask how far the Paretian principle can be extended without contradicting Strong Anonymity. We show that Strong Anonymity combined with four auxiliary axioms has two consequences: (i) There is sensitivity for an increase in one well-being component if and only if a co-finite set of other well-being components are at least ɛ (>0) higher, and (ii) adding people to an infinite population cannot have positive social value.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:mateco:v:103:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000945
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24