Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology

S-Tier
Journal: Review of Economic Studies
Year: 1988
Volume: 55
Issue: 3
Pages: 469-483

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The Rawlsian maximin criterion is combined with nonpaternalistic altruistic preferences in a nonrenewable resource technology. The maximin programme is shown to be time-inconsistent for a subset of initial conditions. A solution to this intergenerational conflict is found, under a given assumption, as a generically unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:oup:restud:v:55:y:1988:i:3:p:469-483.
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24