The Incentive Effects of Dismissals, Efficiency Wages, Piece-Rates and Profit-Sharing.

A-Tier
Journal: Review of Economics and Statistics
Year: 1991
Volume: 73
Issue: 3
Pages: 451-59

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The relation of several incentive schemes to productivity is studied, with a particular emphasis on the effects and determinants of dismissals. Dismissals turn out to be positively, but in a nonlinear way, associated with productivity. Similarly, profit-sharing raises productivity. Wages and piece-rates are insignificant. Profit-sharing decreases the number of dismissals made by firms. Copyright 1991 by MIT Press.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:tpr:restat:v:73:y:1991:i:3:p:451-59
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25