Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System.

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 1996
Volume: 86
Issue: 4
Pages: 830-51

Score contribution per author:

8.043 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Reciprocal exchange, or gift exchange, remains a widespread means of obtaining goods and services. This paper examines the persistence of reciprocal exchange by formalizing the interaction between self-enforcing exchange agreements and monetary market exchange. When more people engage in reciprocal exchange, market search costs increase, reciprocity is easier to enforce and yields higher utility. Thus, personalized exchange can persist even when it is inefficient. Conversely, large markets can destroy reciprocity when reciprocal exchange is efficient. The results characterize the use of personal 'connections' as a system of reciprocal exchange and explain the disappearance of reciprocity when tribes encounter markets. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:86:y:1996:i:4:p:830-51
Journal Field
General
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25