Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 5
Pages: 154-58

Score contribution per author:

2.681 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:5:p:154-58
Journal Field
General
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-25