Price level targeting under fiscal dominance

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of International Money and Finance
Year: 2023
Volume: 137
Issue: C

Score contribution per author:

0.670 = (α=2.01 / 3 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

The adoption of a “makeup” strategy has been one of the proposals in the review of the Fed’s monetary policy framework. Another suggestion, to avoid the zero lower bound, has been a more active role for fiscal policy. We put together these ideas to study price level targeting under a fiscally-led regime. We find that following a deflationary demand shock: (i) the central bank should increase (rather than decrease) the policy rate; (ii) the central bank, thus, avoids the zero lower bound; (iii) price level targeting is welfare improving with respect to inflation targeting, unless one considers a nonstandard inflation targeting rule with a negative inflation coefficient and a high degree of smoothing.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:jimfin:v:137:y:2023:i:c:s0261560623000773
Journal Field
International
Author Count
3
Added to Database
2026-01-24