“Trust me, I am an economist.” A note on suspiciousness in laboratory experiments

B-Tier
Journal: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
Year: 2015
Volume: 55
Issue: C
Pages: 103-107

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of informing subjects that no deception will be used in a laboratory experiment. When implemented as a part of recruitment procedure, this information makes no difference in participants’ suspiciousness. Conversely, no-deception reminders placed in the instructions substantially reduce self-reported suspiciousness but not actual (trust-dependent) behavior.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:soceco:v:55:y:2015:i:c:p:103-107
Journal Field
Experimental
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25