On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations

B-Tier
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
Year: 2011
Volume: 72
Issue: 2
Pages: 452-466

Score contribution per author:

2.011 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 1.0x B-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If this sensitivity is higher than a certain cut-off, which depends on the number of players, then the dynamics satisfies property (W). If it is equal to or below that cut-off, then the dynamics does not satisfy property (W).

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:452-466
Journal Field
Theory
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-25