Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals

S-Tier
Journal: American Economic Review
Year: 2014
Volume: 104
Issue: 2
Pages: 672-86

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 2 authors) × 4.0x S-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

Resale price maintenance (RPM), slotting fees, loyalty rebates, and other related vertical practices can allow an incumbent manufacturer to transfer profits to retailers. If these retailers were to accommodate entry, upstream competition could lead to lower industry profits and the breakdown of these profit transfers. Thus, in equilibrium, retailers can internalize the effect of accommodating entry on the incumbent's profits. Consequently, if entry requires downstream accommodation, entry can be deterred. We discuss policy implications of this aspect of vertical contracting practices.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:aea:aecrev:v:104:y:2014:i:2:p:672-86
Journal Field
General
Author Count
2
Added to Database
2026-01-24