Subsidizing (and taxing) business procurement

A-Tier
Journal: Journal of Public Economics
Year: 2008
Volume: 92
Issue: 7
Pages: 1629-1643

Score contribution per author:

4.022 = (α=2.01 / 1 authors) × 2.0x A-tier

α: calibrated so average coauthorship-adjusted count equals average raw count

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of a subsidy (or tax) on a market where a downstream manufacturer uses a competitive tender to procure inputs from upstream suppliers. Subsidizing input production can result in input price decreases that are greater than the effective decrease in marginal costs. That is, overshifting occurs. When the size of the subsidy is not too large, the downstream firm can enjoy an increase in profits greater than the government expenditure on the subsidy. A relatively weak sufficient condition for these results to hold is that suppliers earn a positive profit margin on the marginal unit sold, before taking into account any subsidy payment. Stronger sufficient conditions, tailored to each result, are provided.

Technical Details

RePEc Handle
repec:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:7:p:1629-1643
Journal Field
Public
Author Count
1
Added to Database
2026-01-24