Institution: Unknown
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 1.17 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.35 |
| All Time | 0.67 | 1.17 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 6.03 |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017 | Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 4 |
| 2017 | Durable coalitions and communication: Public versus private negotiations | Journal of Public Economics | A | 3 |
| 2013 | Rules with Discretion and Local Information | Quarterly Journal of Economics | S | 3 |
| 2012 | On dynamic compromise | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |