Institution: Universidad Nacional de San Luis
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/agustingermanbonifacio/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 3.09 | 0.84 | 3.94 | 74% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.10 | 0.84 | 4.94 | 71% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.10 | 0.84 | 4.94 | 81% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Obvious manipulations, consistency, and the uniform rule | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2025 | Not obviously manipulable allotment rules | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2024 | Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2024 | A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 2023 | Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: Local and weakly single-peaked domains | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 3 |
| 2022 | The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 5 |
| 2021 | Corrigendum to "On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness" [Games Econ. Behav. 124 (2020) 219–238] | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2020 | On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |