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Yves Breitmoser

Institution: Universität Bielefeld

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 2005

Most Recent: 2020

RePEc ID: pbr372 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 3.03 0.00 3.03 58%
All Time 8.07 0.00 12.78 3.03 23.88 95%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 14
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 20.87

Publications (14)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2020 Why should majority voting be unfair? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2019 Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2015 Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2015 Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma American Economic Review S 1
2014 On the beliefs off the path: Equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2013 Increasing marginal costs are strategically beneficial in forward trading Economics Letters C 1
2013 Estimation of social preferences in generalized dictator games Economics Letters C 1
2013 Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 2
2012 Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests Games and Economic Behavior B 1
2012 On the endogeneity of Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg competition in oligopolies International Journal of Industrial Organization B 1
2012 Proto-coalition bargaining and the core Economic Theory B 1
2011 Extortion in the laboratory Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization B 3
2010 Understanding perpetual R&D races Economic Theory B 3
2005 Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players Economics Letters C 1