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Sandro Brusco

Global rank #1887 97%

Institution: Stony Brook University - SUNY

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1988

Most Recent: 2016

RePEc ID: pbr81 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Last 10 Years 0.00 0.00 1.01 0.00 1.01
All Time 1.01 12.07 11.06 0.00 41.22

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 21
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 28.27

Publications (21)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2016 Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2012 The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2011 The Economics of Contingent Re-auctions American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 3
2010 Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2009 Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints Economic Theory B 2
2008 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING‐BID AUCTIONS* Journal of Industrial Economics A 2
2007 Liquidity Coinsurance, Moral Hazard, and Financial Contagion Journal of Finance A 2
2007 Deregulation with consensus Economic Theory B 2
2006 On enhanced cooperation Journal of Public Economics A 2
2006 Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments Journal of Economic Theory A 1
2005 Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets European Economic Review B 2
2002 Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities Review of Economic Studies S 2
2001 Optimal secession rules European Economic Review B 2
1999 Cost minimization and regulation in general equilibrium: an example Economics Letters C 1
1999 Implementation with Extensive Form Games: One Round of Signaling Is Not Enough Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1999 The Optimal Design of a Market Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1998 Unique Implementation of the Full Surplus Extraction Outcome in Auctions with Correlated Types Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1997 Implementing Action Profiles when Agents Collude Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1996 Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Wage Contracts Journal of Economics & Management Strategy B 1
1995 Perfect Bayesian Implementation. Economic Theory B 1
1988 Heterogeneous distribution of information and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium in a partial equilibrium model Economics Letters C 1