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Mike Burkart

Global rank #2829 96%

Institution: London School of Economics (LSE)

Primary Field: Finance (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1995

Most Recent: 2023

RePEc ID: pbu112 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.01: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total
Last 5 Years 0.00 1.68 0.00 0.00 3.35
Last 10 Years 0.00 1.68 0.00 0.00 3.35
All Time 3.85 6.20 4.69 0.00 32.51

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 17
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 14.81

Publications (17)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2023 Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law The Review of Financial Studies A 3
2022 Activism and Takeovers The Review of Financial Studies A 2
2015 Signalling to Dispersed Shareholders and Corporate Control Review of Economic Studies S 2
2015 Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers Review of Finance B 2
2014 Legal Investor Protection and Takeovers Journal of Finance A 4
2011 Security-voting structure and bidder screening Journal of Financial Intermediation B 3
2011 What You Sell Is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts The Review of Financial Studies A 3
2008 Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union American Economic Review S 4
2008 One Share - One Vote: the Theory Review of Finance B 2
2006 Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection Journal of Financial Intermediation B 2
2004 In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit American Economic Review S 2
2003 Family Firms Journal of Finance A 3
2003 ‘Shareholder protection, compulsory acquisition and the efficiency of the takeover process’ Economic Policy B 2
2000 Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control Journal of Finance A 3
1998 Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders Journal of Political Economy S 3
1997 Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm Quarterly Journal of Economics S 3
1995 Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests. Journal of Finance A 1