Institution: Lunds Universitet
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 0.00 | 2.02 | 0.67 | 1.01 | 3.70 | 78% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 2000 | The 17th Arne Ryde Symposium, "Focal Points--Coordination, Complexity, and Communication in Strategic Contexts" | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 3 |
| 1998 | Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games | Economics Letters | C | 2 |
| 1997 | Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling Games | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |