Institution: Rutgers University-New Brunswick
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | - |
| All Time | 8.07 | 10.09 | 1.68 | 0.34 | 20.18 | 94% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006 | When and why not to auction | Economic Theory | B | 2 |
| 2005 | Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions | Economics Letters | C | 3 |
| 2005 | Search and Collusion in Electronic Markets | Management Science | B | 3 |
| 2004 | Blackwell's ordering and public information | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2000 | Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 2 |
| 1999 | Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities | Journal of Political Economy | S | 1 |
| 1999 | The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply | American Economic Review | S | 3 |
| 1998 | Coordination in Auctions with Entry | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |