Institution: ESSEC Business School
Primary Field: Industrial Organization (weighted toward more recent publications)
Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/gorkemcelikswebsite/
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 2.69 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 3.70 | 74% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 2.69 | 2.02 | 0.50 | 5.21 | 73% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 10.76 | 5.05 | 0.50 | 16.31 | 92% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently | International Economic Review | B | 2 |
| 2023 | Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures | Journal of Industrial Economics | A | 3 |
| 2021 | Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 3 |
| 2017 | Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation | International Journal of Industrial Organization | B | 2 |
| 2016 | Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design | Canadian Journal of Economics | C | 2 |
| 2015 | Implementation by Gradual Revelation | RAND Journal of Economics | A | 1 |
| 2011 | Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2009 | Mechanism design with collusive supervision | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2006 | Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 1 |