Roger D. Congleton

Institution: George Mason University

Primary Field: Public (weighted toward more recent publications)

First Publication: 1979

Most Recent: 2024

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period	A (2x)	B (1x)	C (½x)	Total	Percentile
Last 5 Years	0.00	4.04	2.02	6.05	87%
Last 10 Years	0.00	12.78	2.35	15.14	95%
All Time	12.11	66.26	5.38	83.76	99%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 47

Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 81.11

Publications (47)

Year	Article	Journal	Tier	Authors
2026	Constitutional Political Economy and the Nature and Effects of Rights	Kyklos	C	1
2024	Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective	Kyklos	C	1
2023	Federalism and pandemic policies: variety as the spice of life	Public Choice	B	1
2022	Behavioral economics and the Virginia school of political economy: overlaps and complementarities	Public Choice	B	1
2020	On the stability of U.S. politics: post-sample forecasts and refinements of the Congleton–Shughart models of Social Security and Medicare benefit levels	Public Choice	B	3
2020	Ethics and good governance	Public Choice	B	1
2019	On the emergence of a classic work: a short history of the impact of Gordon Tullock’s Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft	Public Choice	B	1
2018	Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees	Public Choice	B	1
2017	The Electoral Politics and the Evolution of Complex Healthcare Systems	Kyklos	C	3
2017	Robert D. Tollison and the economics of politics	Public Choice	B	1
2015	Thanks to Gordon Tullock	Public Choice	B	1
2015	The Logic of Collective Action and beyond	Public Choice	B	1
2012	On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts	Public Choice	B	1
2012	The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock	Public Choice	B	1
2012	Growing up with The Calculus of Consent	Public Choice	B	1
2011	Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance	Public Choice	B	1
2010	The rise of the modern welfare state, ideology, institutions and income security: analysis and evidence	Public Choice	B	2
2010	Dennis C. Mueller: Reason, religion, and liberal democracy	Public Choice	B	1
2009	On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 2008–2009	Public Choice	B	1
2007	Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance	Public Choice	B	1
2007	Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity	Public Choice	B	1
2007	Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice	Public Choice	B	1
2006	The story of Katrina: New Orleans and the political economy of catastrophe	Public Choice	B	1
2004	The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock	Public Choice	B	1
2002	Risk-Averse Taxpayers and the Allocation of Tax Enforcement Effort: Law Enforcement or Leviathan? Some Empirical Evidence	Public Finance Review	C	1
2001	Help, harm or avoid? On the personal advantage of dispositions to cooperate and punish in multilateral PD games with exit	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	2
2001	Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion.	Public Choice	B	1
2001	Rational Ignorance, Rational Voter Expectations, and Public Policy: A Discrete Informational Foundation for Fiscal Illusion	Public Choice	B	1
1998	Voter Discernment and Candidate Entry in Pluralitarian Election.	Public Choice	B	2
1997	Political Efficiency and Equal Protection of the Law	Kyklos	C	1
1996	On the rationality of mutually immiserating coercion	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	2
1995	On the Political Economy of State Highway Expenditures: Some Evidence of the Relative Performance of Alternative Public Choice Models.	Public Choice	B	2
1994	The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators.	Public Choice	B	2
1992	Political Deadlocks and Distributional Information: The Value of the Veil.	Public Choice	B	2
1992	Political Institutions and Pollution Control.	Review of Economics and Statistics	A	1
1991	The economic role of a work ethic	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	1
1991	Ideological conviction and persuasion in the rent-seeking society	Journal of Public Economics	A	1
1991	Information, Special Interests, and Single-Issue Voting.	Public Choice	B	1
1989	Efficient status seeking: Externalities, and the evolution of status games	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	B	1
1989	Campaign finances and political platforms: The economics of political controversy	Public Choice	B	1
1988	Evaluating rent-seeking losses: Do the welfare gains of lobbyists count?	Public Choice	B	1
1988	An Overview of the Contractarian Public Finance of James Buchanan	Public Finance Review	C	1
1986	Rent-seeking aspects of political advertising	Public Choice	B	1
1984	Committees and rent-seeking effort	Journal of Public Economics	A	1
1983	Non-global social contracts: A note on inefficient social institutions	Public Choice	B	2
1982	A model of asymmetric bureaucratic inertia and bias	Public Choice	B	1
1979	Proportional and progressive income taxation with utility-maximizing governments	Public Choice	B	2