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Eddie Dekel

Institution: Tel Aviv University

Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)

Homepage: https://sites.google.com/site/eddiedekelsite/

First Publication: 1986

Most Recent: 2019

RePEc ID: pde118 ↗

Publication Scores

Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).

Period S (4x) A (2x) B (1x) C (½x) Total Percentile
Last 5 Years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Last 10 Years 5.38 0.00 1.01 0.00 6.39 78%
All Time 32.29 20.18 6.73 0.50 59.71 98%

Publication Statistics

Raw Publications 29
Coauthorship-Adjusted Count 25.92

Publications (29)

Year Article Journal Tier Authors
2019 Mechanisms With Evidence: Commitment and Robustness Econometrica S 3
2018 Disclosure and Choice Review of Economic Studies S 3
2018 Uniqueness, stability and comparative statics for two-person Bayesian games with strategic substitutes Economic Theory B 2
2014 Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification American Economic Review S 3
2014 The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early American Economic Journal: Microeconomics B 2
2012 Buying Shares and/or Votes for Corporate Control Review of Economic Studies S 2
2009 Temptation-Driven Preferences Review of Economic Studies S 3
2008 Vote Buying: General Elections Journal of Political Economy S 3
2007 Evolution of Preferences-super-1 Review of Economic Studies S 3
2006 Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction Review of Economic Studies S 2
2005 Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2004 Learning to play Bayesian games Games and Economic Behavior B 3
2003 Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions Games and Economic Behavior B 2
2002 Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction Journal of Economic Theory A 3
2001 Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections Journal of Political Economy S 2
1999 On the Evolution of Attitudes towards Risk in Winner-Take-All Games Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1999 Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1998 Recent developments in modeling unforeseen contingencies European Economic Review B 3
1993 On the Relationship between Mutation Rates and Growth Rates in a Changing Environment Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1993 Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1992 Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures Games and Economic Behavior B 3
1992 On the evolution of optimizing behavior Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1991 Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences Journal of Economic Theory A 3
1990 Collusion through Insurance: Sharing the Cost of Oil Spill Cleanups. American Economic Review S 2
1990 One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium Games and Economic Behavior B 2
1990 Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example Journal of Economic Theory A 1
1990 Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty Journal of Economic Theory A 2
1987 Common knowledge with probability 1 Journal of Mathematical Economics C 2
1986 An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the independence axiom Journal of Economic Theory A 1