Institution: Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 4.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 4.04 | 78% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 4.04 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 4.54 | 69% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 12.11 | 1.68 | 3.36 | 17.15 | 93% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Legislative informational lobbying | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2016 | Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 2 |
| 2013 | The two-party system under alternative voting procedures | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 1 |
| 2011 | Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: an experiment | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 3 |
| 2009 | Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? | Journal of Economic Theory | A | 1 |
| 2009 | The Salient Issue of Issue Salience | Journal of Public Economic Theory | C | 1 |
| 2007 | Blame-game politics in a coalition government | Journal of Public Economics | A | 1 |
| 2007 | Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 2 |
| 2006 | Approval voting with endogenous candidates | Games and Economic Behavior | B | 2 |
| 2003 | Family size and optimal income taxation | Journal of Population Economics | B | 3 |