Institution: Université de Franche-Comté
Primary Field: Theory (weighted toward more recent publications)
Scores use coauthorship adjustment: α/n credit per paper, where n = number of authors. α = 2.02: calibrated so average adjusted count equals average raw count (a zero-sum adjustment).
| Period | S (4x) | A (2x) | B (1x) | C (½x) | Total | Percentile |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Last 5 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.09 | 1.60 | 45% |
| Last 10 Years | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.19 | 1.60 | 3.78 | 63% |
| All Time | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.19 | 2.86 | 5.05 | 82% |
| Year | Article | Journal | Tier | Authors |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Cooperative games with diversity constraints | Journal of Mathematical Economics | C | 4 |
| 2023 | Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 3 |
| 2022 | Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games | Public Choice | B | 4 |
| 2022 | Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences | Theory and Decision | C | 2 |
| 2020 | Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting | Public Choice | B | 3 |
| 2018 | Another perspective on Borda’s paradox | Theory and Decision | C | 2 |
| 2016 | Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes | Public Choice | B | 2 |
| 2015 | A geometric examination of majorities based on difference in support | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 4 |
| 2012 | Borda’s Paradox with weighted scoring rules | Social Choice and Welfare | C | 2 |
| 2010 | On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules | Theory and Decision | C | 2 |