|
2020
|
A game of hide and seek in networks
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2019
|
The measurement of welfare change
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
2016
|
Credibility and Strategic Learning in Networks
|
International Economic Review
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Minimum cost arborescences
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2012
|
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2010
|
Child labor and household wealth: Theory and empirical evidence of an inverted-U
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
3
|
|
2010
|
Externalities, potential, value and consistency
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2009
|
Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
A
|
4
|
|
2009
|
Communication networks with endogenous link strength
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2009
|
Local network externalities and market segmentation
|
International Journal of Industrial Organization
|
B
|
2
|
|
2008
|
Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
3
|
|
2007
|
Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
3
|
|
2005
|
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2005
|
Farsighted network formation
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2004
|
Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Reforming Food Subsidy Schemes: Estimating the Gains from Self‐targeting in India
|
Review of Development Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
2004
|
Equilibrium agenda formation
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Voting by Successive Elimination and Strategic Candidacy
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2002
|
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
2001
|
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
3
|
|
1999
|
Comparison functions and choice correspondences
|
Social Choice and Welfare
|
C
|
2
|
|
1998
|
Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1997
|
Stable Networks,
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1996
|
Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1995
|
Protective behavior in matching models
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1994
|
Bayesian Implementation: The Necessity of Infinite Mechanisms
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1993
|
A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
4
|
|
1993
|
A Characterization of Egalitarian Equivalence.
|
Economic Theory
|
B
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Constrained egalitarian allocations
|
Games and Economic Behavior
|
B
|
2
|
|
1991
|
Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1991
|
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
2
|
|
1989
|
A consistent bargaining set
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
4
|
|
1989
|
Subsidy Policies with Capital Accumulation: Maintaining Employment Levels.
|
Journal of Population Economics
|
B
|
3
|
|
1988
|
Covering sets and a new condorcet choice correspondence
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|
|
1987
|
A note on measures of distance between imcome distributions
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
2
|
|
1982
|
Implementability via protective equilibria
|
Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
C
|
2
|
|
1980
|
On the Possibility of Consistent Voting Procedures
|
Review of Economic Studies
|
S
|
1
|
|
1977
|
Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
|
Journal of Economic Theory
|
A
|
1
|